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Explorations into the conceptof liquidity preference
Shortly before General came to light, Keynes
announced his research programas consisting in the study of truly
monetary economies. These, that he called monetary production
economies, were defined by a certain number of features,
foremost among which was the special role money performs in
them. According to Keynes, in a monetary economy one could
not conceive either of a short-period nor of a long-period
equilibrium position without considering the behavior of money
“betweenthe first state and the last” (CWJMK XIII, p 409). A
monetary economycould be conceived asin a state of rest ina
large number of long-period equilibrium positions but in order to
say which would actually be achievable one had to be able to
describe the actual monetary policy that was being followed in
that economy. (CWJMK XXIX, p. 55)
After the publication: of The General Theory, Keynes
insisted on the special role money played in the kind of economy
he was modeling. In “The General Theory of Employment”,
Keynes argued that there were two main novelties in his book:
the treatment of uncertainty andits relationship with money, and
the concept of propensity to consume(presented in the paper in
this order). Keynes accused the classics of accepting lunatic
behavior whenthey referred to the possibility of retaining money
as a store of value, because in a world affected only by
measurable risk there would always be analternative asset to
dominate money. According to Keynes, money would lull one’s
disquietude when subject to unpredictable risks (non-measurable
uncertainty) because of its special properties so that only in a
model that recognized these risks money could be approached as
an asset. Keynes’s principle of effective demand, that is, the
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possibility that demand may falter because agents use their
income to buy non-reproducible wealth, specially in monetary
form, instead of using it to purchase reproducible wealth, followed
fromthis particular conception. The long-period non-neutrality of
moneyrested, thus, on the positing of money and reproducible
capital as alternative forms of accumulation of wealth.
The same fundamental ideas were also expressed in a
parallel debate with Ohlin, Robertson and others. Here, Keynes
defended his proposition that interest rates were a reward for
parting with liquidity and, thus, for parting with money, that was
the asset endowed withthe highest liquidity premium ofall. Again,
Keynes was arguing that money was a form of wealth and
interest rates were the price that guided the choice between liquid
and illiquid wealth, instead of the choice between present and
future consumption. As money was, however, also demanded as
a meansofpayment(to finance boththe expenditures with normal
transactions and the discretionary spending, that Keynes then
called the finance motive for demanding money), monetary theory
was complicated bythe need to considerthis duality of roles for
money.
The complexity of the argument was to be the cause of
much misunderstandingin the development ofliquidity preference
theory. The most important difficulty to be faced was the
relationship between money and credit. In effect, most authors
seemed to understand Keynes’s proposed monetary theory of the
interest rate as a cumbersome way of saying that interest rates
were determined by credit conditions, even though





Milton Friedman, for Instance, could accuse
Keynesians of confusing money and credit. Blinder, years later.explicitly resurrected loanable funds theory (according to whichinterest rates are determined by supply of and demandfor credit)as the way to discuss the influence of interest rates in hisKeynesian model (Blinder, 1989),
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The dominant view seemed to have been proposed by
Hicks, according to whom in a general equilibrium model the
equilibrium position of any market depends’on what happensin all
other markets. By Walras’ law, one can always drop one ofthe
markets when solving the whole model. If one dropped the
market for credit, one would be advancingliquidity preference, if
the money market was dropped, one would be adopting loanable
funds theory. It was a matter of convenience, perhaps, certainly
of preference, but not of substance.
In fact, the evolution of the mainstream approach to
liquidity preference led to a convergence with the quantity theory
of money, specially in the form Friedmangave it in the fifties. To
separate Keynesians and quantity theorists there remained only
their expectations as to the interest elasticities of the money
demandfunction, an issue to be settled by empirical testing.
There may be reasons, however, to consider liquidity
preference in a different way, and many“non-orthodox” authors
followed this line, that was more faithful to Keynes’s ownoriginal
conception. In The General Theory itself, in a difficult and for
long forgotten chapter (the seventeenth), Keynes emphasized the
line of considering money as anasset, interest rates as a reward
for parting with the specific attribute monetary assets would have,
their very high liquidity premium. The theory could be generalized
to consider other kinds ofassets, that would pay an “own-rate of
interest” . The equivalence of the marketinterest rate as an index
of money’s liquidity premium wasclear also in other works where
it was seen as money’s marginal efficiency, term created by
Keynes to refer to the rate of return on real assets. According
to this line of interpretation, the attention given to the
determination of the interest rate by the interaction between
supply and demand for moneyresults from the level aggregation
chosen by Keynes, confronting money, onthe one hand,to bonds,
onthe other. This choice of aggregates simplified the problem of
asset choice from the angle Keynes privileged, that was the
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opposition between liquid andilliquid assets.It was, however,only
a preliminary step towards a more generaltheory ofasset pricing,
highlighting the special role that was to be given to moneyin an
economy marked by non-measurable uncertainty. In this sense,
liquidity preference should not be seen as an awkward way of
conceiving the demand for money, but as the abstract argument
explaining howthe price of assets (and debts) are formed.
It was this perspective that, in fact, seemed to Justify the
whole effort of conceiving The General Theoryas an exp]
of why and how moneycould affect the real economy,not only
in the short but also in the long run. The relationship between
money and capital assets was, however, quickly forgotten inmainstream Keynesian macroeconomics.? Authors like JoanRobinson and Richard Kahn,first, and Davidson and Minsky,
among others, later, sustained that the original path was morefruitful. In this paper, we try to reconstruct their attempts todevelop Keynes’s original argument to show, then, that someextensions of the concept are still to be completed so that aresearch program defined around the liquidity preferencehypothesis is still very muchalive. To doit, we presentfirst, insection 2, a summary of Keynes’s General Theory presentationof liquidity preference as a theory of money demand. Section 3extends the argumentto the examination of asset pricing,Introducing the arguments of Robinson, Kahn, etc. Section 4Presents the idea that money supply as much as money demandcan be approached throughliquidity preference, in an argumentthat could be seen as a way out of the usual confrontation
2 Actually,it would sometimessurface
Tobin’s model ofmone
should be seen as les;
anation
in the formofcuriosa. For instance,
y and growth would Suggest that monetary economies$ efficient than non-monetary economies since the
course. bothcasesillustrate the diffi
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between “horizontalists and verticalists”. Section 5 focus on
extensions of the theory to deal with chronic inflation. Section 6
presents soine provisional remarksrelated to the behavior of asset




The cornerstone of Keynes's, and post Keynesian,
monetary analysis is the relation between money and contracts.
Money-denominated forward contracts are an essential element
of coordination of an economy where production is organized by
autonomous private agents promoting seeking individual gain.
Forward contracts reduces and socializes the uncertainties of
undertaking production activities that take time to unfold and
allows some measure ofcost control on the part of entrepreneurs
(Cf. Davidson, 1978). As Max Weber explained, a modern
capitalist economy is based on the rational calculation of
advantages to be accrued by the individuals that organize
production. This calculation of advantages requires a common
unit of reckoning prospective costs and benefits. A
money-denominated systemof forward contracts establishes this
unit of accountat the sametime in whichit increases the degree
of predictability of economic processes.
Accordingly, Keynes states that the primary concept of
money is money-of-account, the unit in which contracts are
expressed (CWJMK,V,p. 3). Money proper, that is, the thing
which effectively circulates and discharges debts represents the
money-of-account. Again, according to Keynes, the moneyness
of the legal tender, the thing that settles debts, is derived fromits
relation to the money-of-account and to contracts. Other assets
that also play the role of money, namely of being accepted to
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liquidate contractual debts, derive their own moneynessfromthe
possibility of replacing the legal tender undercertain conditions.
Money becomesanassetprecisely becauseofits capacity
to discharge contractual debts when they come due (Davidson,
1978). This is the sourceofits liquidity attribute. Other assets can
share this property depending ontheir degree of convertibility into
moneyproper, the degree ofrisk involved in their exchange for
money*. Forward moneycontracts, on the other hand,are a factor
of continuity over time since they define flows of goods and
services to be made available and their money values for a
continuum of future dates. The more complete a system of
forward contracts is, the safer an asset money becomes, When
the time to settle debts comes, he who possesses moneydoes not
run the risks of being incapable of honoring his commitments and
suffering the sanction such a system must impose in suchcases.
Moneybecomes,thus, a general form of wealth, able to liquidate
any kind of commitment’, in contrast to other forms of wealth the
convertibility of which into means of paymentis conditional on the
state of their markets at that same moment. On the other hand
it is also a safe claim to wealth in the future period covered by
contracts: it is a claim against income-to-be-produced, at fixed
exchangerates. Future auction prices remain uncertain, but risks
are largely eliminated in the case of goods and services produced
to order and much reduced in the case of goods produced to
market whenspotprices are stably related to costs of
that are themselves set by contract.
The character of money being a general form of wealth
makes it a suitable means to effect defensive Strategies in the
production,
3 Something which depends onthe existence of spot markets for exististocks ofthese assets. See Kaldor (1960). Davids ane. onC1990) (1978) and Carvalho
4 Since onecansee even spottransactionsas a 5
relations where the nature ofthe operation does
formal contracts worthwhile.
pecial form of contractual
not make the Signature of
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face of an uncertain future. It is an asset the return of which
comesin the form of a liquidity premium rather than a pecuniary
compensation. Otherassetsdo not offer the same defense against
uncertainty and compensate for this imperfection by paying
interest to their holders. Underuncertainty, that is, the possibility
that the future will bring unexpected changes,flexibility to adapt
to new environments is a gain initself. That is why people may
prefer to remain with their choices open until things get clear
enoughto allowa proper decision to be made. Holding moneyis
a formof precaution. If wealth accumulationis a forward-looking
activity, agents will, in principle. prefer to remain liquid because
no one knows for sure what the future will look like and, thus,
which specific form of wealth would result more advantageous.
To accept less flexible alternatives, then, wealth-holders have to
bribed that is, they have to be pecuniarily compensated forthe
reducedliquidity of assets other than money. The interest rate, as
the representative of this compensation, has to be whateveris
necessaryto convince agentsto part with liquidity. The higher the
degree of illiquidity of anasset, the higher mustbe, in equilibrium,
the compensation paid to convince wealth holders to accept the
risks it represents. This mechanism of determination of interest
rates is the fundamental statement of liquidity preference theory.
b. Industrial Circulation and Financial Circulation
Manypost Keynesians consider Keynes's discussion of
monetary matters in the Treatise on Money superior to that
presented in The General Theory.; In the latter, Keynes discussed
liquidity preference and the determinationofinterest rates in terms
of supply and demand for money.In the Treatise Keynes adopted
a more general approach, based on the distinction between two
circuits of monetary circulation: industrial circulation and financial
circulation.
5 For a dissenting voice see Minsky (1975).
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Industrial circulation refers to the amount ofmoneyinuse to
support the flow ofgoodsandservices produced in an economy. The
amount ofmoneyrequiredto doit depends, naturally, on the average
interval during which moneyis retained between transactions.
Keynesdistinguished between households and firms for having
different habits of payments which implied different velocities of
moneycirculation. Industrial circulation embodies a view ofmoney
very close to that of the Quantity Theory. It seems in accord with
Keynes’s criticismofthe Quantity Theory expressed in The General
Theory that it was not wrong but that it was incomplete. Keynes
sustained one had also to consider a second monetary circuit, the
financial circulation. This circuit included operations with financial
assets, being, thus, unrelated to current income. Moreover,in this
circuit, moneywasnotjust a means ofcirculation, it could also bean
subject of circulation. Moneyitself could be held as anasset. This
notion went much beyond the Marshallian view that money was a
convenience a cheap way of covering the period betweenincome
inflows and outflows.
Orthodox theory had actually always acknowledged the
possibility of hoarding, even thoughit was in the borderline with
irrationality. Keynes’s concept of financial circulation and of
retention of monetaryassets referred to something more importantfor the economy’s operation. It included both active balances usedto buy andsell assets and inactive balancesheld in the expectationof favorable future changes in the pricesofassets. Con fronted withthe perspective of capital losses on financial assets were interestrates to rise in the relevantfuture, wealth holders might preferto holdmoneyinstead. Onthe other hand, those expecting a fall in futurinterest rates would buysecurities now even if they had to borro yfundsto do it. Keynescalledthefirst sroup Bears andthe se Ww
Bulls. Banks would intermediate their Operations by acceon
deposits from bears andproviding loansto bullsto allow them ta buysecurities. In equilibrium, interest rates would settle atthe| iwhich both bulls and bears would be Satisfied with their fi evelin
operations. mancial
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Money,then, would perform very complex functionsin this
kind of economy, connecting industrial and financial circulations,
operating in a dual role as a means of paymentand of an asset,
facilitating the operationofthe real side of the economy,butalso
being a potential cause oftrouble in the case of monetary assets
becoming more attractive than real capital. assets. Inflationary or
deflationaryforces could be triggered if money flowed from one
circuit to the other. Banks and financial institutions, in particular,
performed a crucial function in this economy, not only as
intermediaries, but as actual creators and distributors ofmoneyamong
agents operating in each circuit.
c. Motives to Demand Money
In The General Theory unfortunately, Keynes downplayed the
dichotomybetweenindustrial and financial circulationin favor of a
more abstract approach in which anundifferentiated public demands
moneyfor various motives. Every exchange operationina monetary
economy, whatever its object, involves a transference ofmoneyfrom
a buyerto a seller. Someone whodesires to make a purchase must,
thus, get hold ofmoneyfirst. Distinctionsas to the object ofpurchase
maybe analytically convenient but do notrefer to anyfundamental
difference asto the role ofmoneyintransactions. Thus, for instance,
one candefine active balances as those held in advance of some
definite transactionin oppositionto inactive balances held for possible
butstill undecided purchases in the future. In Keynes's General
Theoryliquidity preference was analyzedin terms suchasthese. The
industrial circulation becamethe transactions motive, as the demand
foractive balances,andthefinancial circulation was transformed into
the precautionary and speculative demands for money, a proximate
approachto that of inactive balances.* The latter was keptas the
 
6 Infact, one maythink of the financial circulationas inactive balances in
a morerestricted way.that is of balances held independently of projected
purchases of goods and services. even though it may be justified by
prospective purchasesoffinancial assets The precautionary motive was
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determinantofinterestrates, together with the (exogenously given)
moneysupply.
Theanalysis of the demand for moneyfor transactions does
not involve deep differences between Keynesian analysis and other
strands of monetary thought. Asit was stated above, onthis matter
Keynes consideredthe classics to be incomplete rather than wrong.
The transactionary demand for money,thatis, the holding ofmoney
in anticipation ofa definite act ofexpenditure, would depend onthe
projected purchasesandthe habits ofpayment.Inthe aggregate,this
could be reasonably approximated bythe level of current income,
giventhe institutions that regulate forms of payment.’ Onthe other
hand, the speculative demand was morea development thana radical
departure of the ideas containedin the Treatise. The conceptandits
application was made moreprecise, being utilizedto set the price of
debts,thatis the interest rate, rather than Pricesof assetsin general,
allowing Keynesto differentiate, when necessary or adequate,the
determination ofmarginal efficiencies ofassets fromthe interestrate
(see Kregel, 1988).
The speculative motive is based on the idea or n
Keynes inherited (and modified) from Marshal.
neoclassical notion of a natural rate of interest
factors (such as time preferences and producti





agent operating with assets has a
mistreated by Keynes in The General Theory,
should be seen as an elementofthe financi
actually merged it with the transactions motive! For a detailed examinati
of the transition betweenthe bears and bulls ofthe Treatise and the dem; wifor money and demandforotherassets in The General Theory see Kregel(1988). Fora discussionofthe origins ofthe Notionofliquidias a modelforasset choice see Kregel (1984 ), eat Mislsiency
7 Davidsonhasinsisted on the importanceofre:
demand for moneyshould be seen as depen
current. income. Thedistinctionis Particular]
changesin discretionary expenditures. See
as will be argued below It
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subjective evaluation, given his own experience and access to
information, of what constitutes a normal rate of interest,
expected to prevail after short-termfluctuations dre allowedfor.
This normal interest rate acts as an anchorto his expectations of
future movements of the interest rate and defines whether the
agent will be a bearor a bull in face of the current interest rate.
The latter will be determined at the point in which bulls and bears
balance each other, as proposed before in the Treatise. In these
terms, if we call r the market interest rate and r* the normal rate
of interest, we have the following decision rules:
bears: r - r* < O and thus E (dr/dt) >0 so Ms > O (no
bonds are purchased)
bulls: r - r* > O and thus E (dr/dt) <0 so Ms = O (the
moneyis used to buy bonds) ‘
A third motive to hold moneyis introduced in The General
Theory that should also be part of the financial circulation, which
is the precautionary motive. Keynes gave it, however, a
surprisingly superficial treatment since one could arguethatit is
as a precaution against an uncertain future that money assumes
its peculiar role in a monetary economy.®
It seems that Keynes was overwhelmed with the difficulties
of analyzing the precautionary motive since it required to consider
explicitly the influence of states of confidence, a notoriously
elusive variable, on the demand for money. As Kahn (1954)
showed, we can consider the precautionary demand as inducing
agents to hold buffer stocks of both moneyand securities in order
8 According to Keynes. the precautionary motive is “to provide for
contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and for unforeseen
opportunities of advantageouspurchase, and also to holdan asset of which
the valueis fixed in terms ofmoney(...)” (Keynes, 1964, p. 196). The latter
element meansto beableto settle debts when necessary.
texto para discussiio- iei/ulr} 13
to avoid capital and incomerisks, respectively. Wealth holders
would recognize that any expectation they mayhaveis liable to
fail and would hedge against failing expectations by keeping
reserves of money and ofsecurities. In this sense, bulls, for
instance, would not commitall their resourcesto securities unless
they expected a future fall of the interest rate with certainty. The
combination between speculative and precautionary motives
would, thus, mean that the speculative demand has to do with
specific expectations as to future movements of the rate of
interest and the precautionary motive with the degree of
confidence on those expectations.
Finally, in the debates that followedthe publication of The
General Theory Keynes acknowledged a fourth Motive to hold
money, which he called finance motive. It was meant to be a
bridge between industrial and financial circulations because it
referred to balances that are held inactive in advance ofthe
purchase ofinvestment goods. The finance motive was actually
an element of the transactions demand but marked by a different
behavior, given its out-of-routine character that would break the
proportionality between current income flows and money demand
The finance demand for money would increase when prospective
not current, income was increased by planned discretionar
spending. Onthe other hand, balances were kept with a view taa definite expenditure plan as with other transactions madein {I .economy. Money was a convenience rather than an setAlthough Keynes madeit clearthatthe finance Motive is casey
to demand money,the use of the term finance gave origintoakinds of equivocations,relating it to Savings,to financial telatioetc., in a debate that was revived very recently.® ns,
9 See Asimakopulos (1983: 1986). Kregel :
(1986). that were, amongotherpapers,. the thenCeo) Davidson
discussion. For a very good andclear account ofthe finan uutionsto this
Chick (1983, pp. 198/200). See also Wells (1981). Th Ce motive, see
debates aroundthcissue,in the thirties and in the “ies tO Pounds of
in Carvalho (1994). eighties, are summarized
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Although the structure of the arguments were deeply
changed, this version ofliquidity preference conserved the main
aspects of the approach:the relation between money, uncertainty
and contracts. The relation between money and uncertainty was
given two forms: one the one hand,it gave a place to influences
like the state of confidence and the precautionary motive; on the
other, it replaced the idea of a natural rate of interest by the
notion of normal rates of interest, formed subjectively by the
individuals operating in the money market. As Shackle (1961)
remarked, this gave to the interest rate a very peculiar nature. In
his words, interest rates have to be reslless variables, with
equilibrium rates always changing values since they result from
the interaction between groups acting under the influence of
heterogeneous expectations. Necessarily, somebody's
expectations are always being disappointed leading to some
revision of their views and, thus, changing the balance between
bulls and bears. A durable equilibrium configuration, in these
circumstances, would be a contradiction in terms.
3. Liquidity Preference as a General Theory of Asset Pricing
The aggregative structure utilized in most of The General
Theory defined two composite assets: money and bonds."In this
case we nay safely state, as Keynes did:
“Thus the rate of interest at any time being the reward for
parting with liquidity, is a measure of the willingness of those who
possess moneyto part with their control overit.” (Keynes, 1964,
p. 167)
10 Sometimes bonds andcapital goodsare fused togetheras in parts of
chapter12. In the Treatise this confusion was widespread and gaveorigin
to criticisms even from Keynes’s mostintimate collaborators. See, for
instance, Kahn’s letters to Keynes in CWJMK,XIII. One should notice, on
the other hand, that money is a composite asset too. See footnote | to page
167 in Keynes (1964).
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Liquidity in The General Theory could only be associated
with moneyor with bonds.In this dichotomic world,the interest
paid on bonds can only be a compensation for their lower degree
of liquidity as compared with money.
Working with only two composite assets had the advantage
of making it clear that the true nature ofinterest resided in its
being a compensation for the risk ofilliquidity rather than a
reward for abstention of consumption per se, which was the
“classical” view of interest. It had, however, two major
weaknesses: it made possible for neoclassical synthesis
Keynesiansto reduceliquidity preference to simply a formulation
of a money demandfunction; secondly, it could lead less careful
readers to ignore that the interest rate was an index related toa
composite asset. These less careful interpreters tended to choose
arbitrary market rates to serve asthe interest rate of The General
Theory, giving rise to endless but essentially useless (because
misdirected) debates as to which rates Keynes had in mind when
presenting his money demand theory andhis marginalefficiency
of capital model of investment and the empirical robustness of
estimated relationships.
The neoclassical synthesis was, in general, guilty of both
faults and so were manyof the neoclassical critics
Nevertheless,it could be easily seenthat liquidity prefe
be gencralized into a generaltheory ofasset pricing b
samegeneralprinciple that different degrees ofliquidit
compensated by pecuniary returns that would define
return obtained for the possessionofdifferent assets. !








1 1 Asa matter of fact, Keynes himself did iti
chapter 17, where he dealt with manyassets instead ofas onl -a modelofassetpricing based onattributes of 4 Rene ane built: i ; Ssets, including liquid;premium accruingto diverseassets in different degrees, in Wiea liquidity
interest scheme. a OWn-rate of
n The General Theory, in
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the spread between the rates of return associated to different
assets, an analog to Ricardo’s model of differential rent.
An extension to a richer menu of assets could be
undertakenalong two lines: one could, as done by Kahn (1954),
explore how Keynes established the margins of indifference
between money and bonds in chapter 15 of The General Theory,
to serve as a basis for a generalization: alternatively, as Robinson
(1951) did, one could extend the analysis of chapter 17 of that
book, to considera richer menuofasset attributes to differentiate
their prices. Let us examine eachof these propositions separately.
Kahnextends the argument that supports the speculative
demand for money from a two-asset (money and bonds) setup to
a three-asset structure (money, bills and bonds). The speculative
demand for money was postulated to emerge when the
wealth-holder expects that the interest rate will increase in the
future so that bonds will suffer a capital loss. The margin of
indifference between money and bonds was established then
whenthe interest paid by a bond was equal to the expected rate
of increase of interest rates so that the income to be earned
would be exactly compensated by the loss in capital value. Kahn
extends then the same principle to differentiate now betweenbills
and bonds. In this case, the margin ofindifference between them
would be set as follows:
“Ifa personis indifferent between bonds andbills , then,
apart from considerationsofrisk, il must meaneither that the two
rates coincide and he expects the long-term rate to remain
constant, or that the rate (measured as a proportionalrate pe/
annum) at which he expects the long-term rate of interest to be
rising (i.e. the price of bondslo be falling) is equalto the excess
of the long-term rate of interest (the rate on bonds, measured as
a rale per annum)over the short-tern rate of interest (the rate
onbills, measured as a rale per annum)- or a similar proportion
in terms of an expectedfall in the long-termrate of interestif the
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short-term rate is higher than the long-term rate.” (Kahn, 1972
p. 73).
With rs standing for the short rate of interest and rl for therate paid on a perpetuity, the margin of indifference betweenbondsandbills would be defined by the equality:
rl - rs = E [drl/dt] ®
Thus, securities of different maturities cou
terms of a yield curve, in which the dem
security would depend on expectations
Id be ordered in
and for each type of
| as to the future behaviorof the spectrum of interest rates in precisely the same waythespeculative demand for money was described in The GeneralTheory. One difficulty that would emerge in this new setup,however, was that one could hardly see why, in a world wheresecurities of manymaturities were available,including veryliquid,capital-risk-free bills, would anybodybother to hold money,!3
Joan Robinson chose a different path. Following Keynes’schapter 17, she developed liquidity preference into a theory ofasset pricing by considering a different array ofattributes assetswould possess in different degrees, Robinson analyzed in detailthe disadvantages that assets other than money would seientclassifying them as: inconvenience (or “illiquidity in the narsense”); capital uncertainty; income uncertainty; and lender’ aah
(“that is, the fear ofpartial or total failure ofthe borr a(Robinson, 1979, p. 140). Specific assets wou ence)) ° , Id the Feby each disadvantageina different degree, and their pricesnoted
u 
12 Equivalently, the margin between bonds and m0 .E [dr/dt]. my wasde
13 There were two ways outof this dilem
The General Theoryinclude very short-te
itself, alternatively, as suggested by Wells (1983es 5 t i Rexplaining interest differentials, but not any roaconsider the mode! as
analogy with Ricardo’s treatmentof differential rent © money Itself, in
fined by r=
ma: Onecould, as Keynes did inTm bills in the Concept ofmoney
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reflect wealth-holders’ evaluations of these shortcomings. In her
words:
“These qualities of the various types of asset are
differently evaluated by different individuals. ... The general
pattern of interest rates depends uponthe distribution of wealth
between owners withdifferent tastes relatively to the supplies of
the various kinds of assets. Each type of asset is a potential
alternative to each other; each has, so to speak, a common
fronticr with every other and with money. Equilibrium in the
marketis attained whenthe interest rates are such that no wealth
is moving across any frontier. Prices are then such that the
market is content to hold just that quantity of each type Of asset
whichis available at the moment.” (Robinson, 1979, p. 143)
One should notice that also in Robinson's approach the
demandfor moneyproperto hold would be hardto justify, except
for transactions costs involved in the purchase of bills, along lines
similar to the Tobin/Baumol approach. Liquidity preference theory
thus generalized, however, is no longer just a theory of money
demand, but a hypothesis as to howasset prices are formed. The
consideration of a set of close substitutes for moneyis not, in
itself, an objection to the model.
Kaldor had beenoneofthe first and most important authors
to develop Keynes’s chapter 17 model,in his seminal 1939 paperon
speculation and stability (Kaldor, 1960). Keynes had shownthat
current prices of assets were determined by the agents’
expectations of returns, considering risk. One could think returns to
be constituted by four elements: q, the rate of quasi-income one
expectedto earn for keepingor using the asset:c, the carrying cost
ratio incurred in the conservationofthe asset; a,its rate of capital
appreciation; and1, its liquidity premium,all of them reckoned in
relationto their current market price. One would then define the
own-rate ofinterest of a givenassetas: atq-c+l. From this it would
follow that for anyasset,
CP=EP+Q-C+1.CP
thatis, the current price (CP)ofan assetis given by the sumofthe
price the assetis expectedto fetchin the date for whichits resaleis
planned, plus the value of Q one expected to rece
period in whichthe asset washeld, minusits c
the value the asset-holder conferred to the Possessionof an assetwith a givenliquidity premium, all of them calculated in moneyterms. EP, Q, C and | are exogenously given (the st
long-termexpectations), so CP has to move to assuret
will be reached. If Q-C+ICP > 0, then CP>EP, whi
backwardation, which meansthatthis asset is relatively scarce, sothat purchasers are willing to pay a Premiumto get holdofitimmediatelyrather than wait until the future date in whichits pricewill be lower. If this particular assetis reproducible, CP>Ep Will be
a sign ofa unsatisfied demand,that is, ofa profitable Opportunitythe producersofthat item.
Kaldorargued that it was the
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created the possibility of disposing ofassets that is the content of
the liquidity premium. Liquidity, thus,is institutional: it depends on
markets that are created by private agents or by the state. This
insight was to be fundamentalin the developmentof liquidity
preference theory.
Amongthe authors that realized the importance of relating
the conceptofliquidity to markets and the behavior of speculators,
Davidson maybe the most consistent in his work. He generalized
Kaldor’s model todifferentiate betweenliquid and illiquid assets, on
the one hand, and to formulate a Keynesian theory of investment
that springs from the model ofasset pricing (Davidson, 1978, ch. 4).
Ina sense, Davidson completes Keynes’s modelofasset choice by
showingthat if one addeda flowsupplyfunction for real capital
assets to the schemeof asset demands obtained from the asset
pricing modelone could determine the volume ofcapital investment
that corresponded to a givenstate of expectations. In addition,
Davidson perfectioned Kaldor’s insight as to the way markets
operate byidentifying the strategic stabilizing role performed by
market-makers. These are residual operators, that perform
preciselythe functions Kaldor envisagedto stabilize markets: they
act against the markettides, as if they were speculators that knew
best where the market would ultimately head to. Behavingthis Way,
market makers dampenfluctuations in the prices of assets,
increasingtheirliquidity premium.
Butliquidity preference theory, understood now as a theory
of wealth accumulation, could be extended one step further. As
Minsky (1975; 1982; 1986) has shown, an agent, when choosing
assets to hold,is not restricted to his own original resources. The
purchasing power over assets may be complemented by access
to credit, thatis, if the agentis willing to issue debts enlarging the
possibility of buying assets. To approachthe portfolio strategy of
agents one hasthento describe not only his decisions as to which
assets to purchase but also what amount and under what terms
he is willing to issue liabilities. Minsky reinterpreted Keynes’s
own-rate ofinterest formula to represent the value of a portfolio
of assets and debts (“negative” assets). The current value ‘of a
portfolio (CP) was determined by the expected yields of assets
(Q). minusthe carrying costofthe portfolio, mainly determined by
the cost of interest paid on borrowed resources (C), plus the
expected vaive of those assets when the time to rearrange the
poritolio came, and the degree of liquidity of the position,
reresented by cash, casi-kickers and the facilities giving access
to additional credit.
In Minsky’s modeltwofactors have to be consideredif an
agent's strategy of wealth accumulationis to be described byhiswhole balance sheet instead of just by his assets. One has todetermine his solvency, which concerns the question of whetherhis assets are worth at least as much as his liabilities, and hisliquidity position, i.e., his capacity to payhis liabilities
come due with the yields of his asse
stocksofliquid assets. In otherw
lime profiles of his expected c
depend on the demand for them.
influences the dem
as they
ts or by appealing to his
ords, one has also to look at the
ash outflows. Prices of assets
The possibility of issuing debts
and for assets. The conditions in which debtscan be created will determine the limits to asset demands and,thus, to the return rates offered on each type of asset. One couldthus measure the fragility of a balance sheet by the comparisonbetween expected inflows and outflows of cash as well as thestocksofliquid assets (that Minskycalled cash-kickers). Minsky’smodel of cyclically changing financial fragility is, thus, ageneralization of liquidity preference theory to deal also withliabilities."4
All these models, beginning with Keynes’s chapter 17 ofThe General Theory, are able to give us short-period solutions for
=
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the price of assets, when the quantities of each asset are given,
and a longer-period solution when the availability of assets is
allowed to change. In the complete model,all privately-created
assets are allowed to changein order to describe a long-period
equilibrium. Nevertheless, Keynes also postulated that money
could not be reproducible as easily as non-monetary assets
because, if it were, it would lose its peculiar characteristic of
having the greatest liquidity premium of all assets (Keynes, 1964,
p. 241n). In The General Theorythe quantity of moneyavailable
is taken as given, insensitive to the demandsofthe public.
4. The Liquidity Preference of Banks and the Money Supply
Keynesian monetary theorists have generally assumed one
of two viewsinrelation to the determination of the money supply.
Sometakeit to be controlled by the monetary authority, implying
that a modelthat considers private behavior in the money market
should take the money supply as an exogenous variable
conditioning private decisions." In contrast, for other Keynesians
the amount of money in circulation is decided by the private
agents themselves, be it because the monetaryauthorities are not
capable of imposing quantitative limits on the amount of money
they issue, or because private agents are themselves capable of
creating money.
According to Kaldor, Keynes was an exogenist, that is, he
believed in the possibility of controlling the quantity of money
because he was neverableto free himself entirely from classical
ideas (Kaldor, 1982). Moore (1988, p. 8) even charges Keynes of
discussing a commodity-money economy rather than a modern
 
15 One could argue,ofcourse,that even if the money supply is underthe
control ofthe central bank thelatter could adopt a reaction function with
certain private actions as arguments that would makeit an endogenous
variable. Be it as it may,the decision to adopt this or that function or to
changeit should be seen as beyondthe control of private agents.
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credit-money economy when he proposed that one fundamental
property of money wasits low elasticity of production. In the
viewofthese authors, post Keynesians should abandon Keynes’s
treatment of money while keeping his theory of employment.'®
Others argue that money is actually taken to be exogenous only
in The General Theory, but that in other works he would be an
endogenist.
In this section we argue in favor of a different view, that
could be seen as a third position between horizontalists and
verticalists, defended by authors like Davidson, Kregel, and Dow
(¢.g., Dow, 1986/7; Dowand Dow, 1989), among others, that is
more in agreement not only with Keynes's own writings on the
behavior of banks but also with the empirical evidence as to how
money markets operate in the real world. This third way rests on
three main propositions, some of which were already presented:
Moneyis a form of debt: debts are issued in result of portfolio
decisions; and liquidity is an institutionally-determinedattribute.
Wealreadyargued thata particularly important Keynesian
Proposition is that moneyis an asset, a formof wealth. It is so
becauseit represents, in the eyesof the public, purchasing power,
a claim over goods and services available or to be produced.
Whatis important, then, is that the public recognizes in a given
thing the powerof representing wealth, of being a claim onit. In
principle, the thing thathas this property is set by the state, in the
laws that regulate the issuance and liquidation of contracts. The
object that mandatorily liquidates contracts is the legal tender, the
Starting point to think of money proper in Keynes's sense. But
some other may cometo share the moneynessattribute if there
comeriiiehen a guarantee that these assets would be
Ifa private meee tender on demand and without capital risks.
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is as credibly a claim onincomeasthe legal tenderis, it will be
a perfect substitute for the latter. Again, to be perfectly
convertible into money meansto be perfectly liquid, and liquidity
is an institutional question.”
Thus, although Keynes does say in The General Theory
that the money supply is determined independently of demand, in
a modern monetary economy mostof whatconstitutes moneyis
created by private agents. Assets other than the legal tender can
become moneyif there is a market strong enough to guarantee
its convertibility, at fixed prices, into legal tender. It is precisely
because, by custom or by law, the monetary authorities of
practically every modern capitalist economy guarantee the
convertibility of some specified private liabilities, such as demand
deposits at commercial banks, at par to legal tender that these
liabilities become money. Thus, the supply of moneycertainly
includes moneyissued by the Authorities and deposits created by
Banks. If we consider, as Keynes did, that the Authorities can
control the amount of money theyoriginally create through their
investment policy," it is to banks we have to turn to examine
whether money is or is not endogenouslycreated. In Minsky’s
words:
“In our economy, money is created as bankers acquire
assets and is destroyed as debtors fulfill their obligations.”
(Minsky, 1982,p. 17)
17 Hicks ( 1967) gives us a stylized description of the emergence ofa
monetary economyin whichinstitutional developments, particularly the
creation of clearing houses andlenders-of-last-resort enlarge the stock of
money beyond whatcould be seen asa narrowerdefiniiion ofa legal tender.
18 Some wouldrefuse even this possibility arguing that the amount of
money the governmentactually issues serves mainly asreserves to the
banking system andis thus predetermined by the creation of deposits,that
is decided by banksto satisfy the public’s demand.So the monetary base
would also be endogenous,and notonly the volume ofdeposits. This view
is associated to Kaldor and Moore. In Brazil. the Kaldorian view was
texto paradiscussao- iei/u fry 25
Or, to quote Chick:
. The money supply is mainly the liability of the bankingay om, not of government. Most monetary policy actions thusrele on the banking system to intermediate between the initialpot'ss action andthe final effect on th * (Chi
eoeam n the money supply.” (Chick,
The liquidity preference model, as we saw, can be easilyextended lo include the issuance of debt. Now, money in moderneconomies is largely constituted byprivate debts issued by banks(in the form of demand deposits). Therefore, if fiquiaieypreference is capable of explaining balance sheet decisions ofain agents it should also explain how Money is created by
SecneBsi® :Gitteaa banks areoriented by the need towhich ascent ae ane liquidity. It is from their choices as toSipniy een buy a liabilities to issue that ultimately thewhen bank results In particular, money comesinto existenceven tone a i re that are issued to allow them to buyaPs b x in the occasion, for instance, of providingfiatfene ween words, money 's created and madeavailable torenee se result of portfolio decisions of banks. Thefemme 0 anks to demandsfrom the public depends onpi sie that orient those portfolio decisions.are tesially ienefete speculative agents since their assetsflow ihe dfn - thantheir liabilities, They actually profitand liabilities 4 nee etween rates that are paid on their assetsles that reflect the different liquidity premia associated
defended by Bresser Pereira
Costa(1 994).
19 In recent vears. Dost Kevn
a growing industry.
and Nakano (1987) and, more recently, by
Si. .
:Sian modeling ofbank behavior has become
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to each componentof their balance sheets. It is by exploring
profitability/liquidity trade-offs that the overall profitability of the
banking business is established. The availability of means of
payment is decided as a by-product of these choices. Banks can
direct their resources to the financial circulation (when they buy,
for instance, government bondsand/orbills) or to the industrial
circulation (if they finance the working capital of firms).
Therefore, depending on the choices made by banks not only the
money supply can vary but also the relation between the
availability of money and aggregate demand can be different,
since, as seen above, industrial and financial circulations have
different connections with the flow of income.
The crucial pointis that the most profitable placements for
banks are seldom the safer or the more liquid. If uncertainty is
high, banks mayprefer the liquidity of excess reserves or, most
probably, the purchase of government securities rather than
running the risks of buying potentially more profitable but also
riskier private liabilities. On the other hand,if there are perceived
Opportunities of profitable investment, banks can, throughliability
management methods, bring money from the financial to the
industrial circulation,to the point of defeating monetarypolicies
intended to constrain the level of activity. The consideration of
liquidity preference on the part of banks certainly imparts a
feature of endogeneity to the money supply, although one could
hardly argue that it makes the supply of money horizontal in the
interest/money space. In particular, the Keynesian argumentis
that there is a larger degree of elasticity in the monetary system
than is usually supposed because of possible changes in the
relation betweenfinancial and industrial circulations, that have, as
we saw, expansive or contractionary impacts on the economy.
What the approach really suggests is that the very dichotomy
between money demand and supply may be too narrow.It is
much the same fundamental factor that is in operation in both
sides of the market: liquidity preference, that orients the non-bank
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public in their planned purchasesofassets and also orients banks
as how to utilize their money-creation facilities. As liquidity
preference is heavily influenced by expectations and the state of
confidence, one would expectthat factors that originate optimistic
expectations in the non-bank public would also do it for banks.
This possible ceincidence of motives led Robinsonto state that:
“... the supply of finance cannot be regarded asa rigid
weck limiting the rate of investment, but must be treated
rater as an element in the general atmosphere encouraging or
retarding accumulation.” (Robinson, 1979, p.21)"
bord
 
5. Liquidity Preference and Inflationary Environments
Production in monetary economiesis organized onthe basis
of a system of forward contracts that allow entrepreneurs to
reduce,at least in part, the uncertainties that plague the future.
The role of contracts is to assure the entrepreneur that labor and
other inputs necessaryfor the continuity of the productive activity
will be available at the required rates andat prices that justify the
decision to produce, oriented by the expectation of profits from
the sale of goods in the markets. The existence of a widespread
system of contracts, as argued before, serves to anchor theexpectations as to the future value of money and to sustain thecalculation of prospective advantages that is characteristic ofcapitalistic production.
The importance of contracts for Ke
Keynesian economics can h
wrote:
ynes and post
ardly be exaggerated. As Keynes
“Theintroduction of a money,u in terms of which loans andcontracts with a time element can b€ expressed, is what reallyee
20 One shouldrealize that as‘inst ystemwith this characteristic tends to be verable if other components are absent to act in an Opposite way.
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A
changes the economic status of a primitive society.”"(CWJMK,
XXVIII, p. 255)
The strategic role of contracts gives us the point from
which to start when thinking about money:
“Now for most important social and economic purposes
what matters is the money-of-account; for it is the
money-of-account which is the subject of contract and of
customaryobligation.” (CWJMK, XXVIII, p. 253)
Finally, Keynes could not be more explicit as to the
importance of a conventionofstability, the generalized beliefin
the stability of the purchasing power of money in the nineteenth
century, for the developmentofthe financial relations that allowed
capitalism to grow (CWJMK,IV).
A post Keynesianapproachto inflation, and, in particular,
to persistently high inflation, has to start from its effects on the
system of contracts, on the definition of the money-of-account
and on the implications of these effects on the liquidity
preferences of the public.
Inflation erodes the purchasing power of money between
twopoints in time. Ifa conventionofstability survives this erosion,
it will be seen as a randomoccurrence not affecting bona fide
contracts. After all, the parties to a contract know that they
cannot control all elements influencing the outcome of a given
process unfolding overtime. Unexpected events, “acts of God”,
can always happen, disappointing oneor both parties. Contracts
are defenses against predictable developments. In a stable-price
economy,inflation would be something like a natural accident.It
can disappoint expectations in the same sense that other
uncontrollable and unpredictable events may.If inflation is not
seen as a systematic force operating in the environment it will
 
21 Weintraub echoes most of these concernsin his writings. See, e.g.,
Weintraub (1978).
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probably be ignored by the parties when defining a contract.
Society has so muchto gain from the existence of a system of
forward money-contracts that eventual losses, even if heavy at
times, do not lead agents to entertain doubts as to the convenience
of its maintenance. The money-of-account remains the same and
the liquidity properties ofthe legal tenderandits closest substitutes
are preserved.
lorsisu.ut «reeping inflation changesthe situation but notin
an oxsential way. Systematic but iow inflation is a nuisance to
coniracting parties, obliging themto take special precautions but
it still does not change the relation between the money-of-account
and moneyproper, that is, the means of payment. Contracts are
still made in terms of money, even if nowthe parties try to
anticipate the erosion that is expected to take place until the
settling date. Theliquidity Properties of moneyareatleast partially
retained since the essence of moneyness, as we saw, is conferred
bythe function of money-of-accountth
1S stillperfoam ed by money
Anessential change takes place wheninf]
and high andthe potenti
 
 
at, in these circumstances,
ationis persistent
al losses from mistaken expectations asto the future course of prices makes it too tisky to acceptcontracts denominated in money. Agents will then search foralternative monies-of-account which may be either a foreignmoney, such as the US dollar, or other units of account, indexingcontracts to price indices that represent baskets of goods that aremeaningful to one or both of the contracting parties. This authorhas examined elsewhere the operation of a monetary economyunder hyperinflation or ina highinflation regime (Carvalho, 1991:1993). For the Purposesof this paper, whatis important to sttaasee
22 Actually moneytends to lose someofits liquidity premium ratherbecause financial instituti
i
| Stitutions and banks try to ntroduce iInnovations that will 2
re i rane
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is that in these cases money loses practically all its liquidity
premium. Nowto hold money is no longer to have the asset in
terms of which debts are denominated. Money has to be
converted into the unit of contracts and this exchangerate is as
uncertain in advance as any other in the economy. Everybody
may expectthat the purchasing power of moneywill fall but the
possibility of wrongly anticipating by how muchit will be
depreciated involves the risk of heavy losses if one tries to hold
money.
Under highly inflationary regimes either financial
innovationsare created, particularly assets that are denominated
in the same unit as contracts are made, ora flight into goods and
foreign assets will be unavoidable. Liquidity preference does not
disappearwith high inflation but it does changethe public’s views
as to what mayconstitute an adequate liquidity time-machine,to
use Davidson’s expression. A very unstable system may emerge
as the public and banks andfinancial institutions adapt themselves
to the existence of multiple units of account.
6. Liquidity Preference in an Open Economy: SomeProvisional
Remarks
No fundamental theoretical difficulties should be met when
generalizing liquidity preference theory to open economies even
though the model has beentraditionally built under closed
economyconditions. In fact, as Kregel (1984) has demonstrated,
Keynes’s model of ownrates of interest was derived of his pre-
vious attempts to build a interest-parity theory of exchangerates.
 
as muchasinflation itself. Keynes’s criticisms of the Fisher theory of
Nominalinterest rates as well as Davidson’s discussion of the most recent
versions of that theory assumea situation where no such policies are
implemented and no choicesare offered to wealth holders. See Keynes
(1964, p. 142): Davidson (1981).
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Nevertheless, the properties of open economies have not been a
favorite theme for most post Keynesians, although exceptions can
be identified.” The increasing globalization of monetary andfi-
nancial operations requires, however, the transcendence of
closed-economy models towards the consideration of a global,
more or less integrated environment.
To deal with an open economy, the model has to be
amended in two main ways: first, one has to allowforthe exist-
ence ofdifferent exchange rate regimes, that affect directly the
liquidity properties of assets denominated in the several moniesand, thus, their prices; secondly, one can no longer restrict the
relevant amounts ofassets and money to what is available or canbe created within the borders of a given country. Monetary andfinancial resources can nowtravel very fast and with much morefreedom than was the case a few years ago. This is not the resultof purely regulatory changes, but it is also caused by technologicalchangesthat dramatically changed the relationship betweenthenational financial markets,
It is usually agreed that if one has absolutely fixed ex-change rates and complete resource mobility, models for closedeconomies would be equally valid for the Open economy. Infactthe world would be just one large country in what relates ismonetaryand financial matters. Liquidity preference theory wouldnot have to be adapled to these conditions. If mobilit isinfect, balance of payments problems could emerge that sould havetwo possible consequences: the amount of money issued inagiven country of and non-monetary financial assets denominatedin that currency could be rationed, the exchange rate might haveto be changed in some future TI i
; Sot » liquidity problems couldgenerate uncertainties as to the Sustainability of a given exchangerate and, as a consequence, as to the values of assets denominated in that currency, mr—_—_—_—_____
23 Mostnotably Davidson( 1982).
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The equivalence of closed economies and open economies
with fixed exchange rates is conditional either on the perfect
mobility of resources or, much morerealistically, on the existence
of institutions that are able to manage the supply of exchangein
order to avoid pressures on the exchangerates.
It is also usually agreed that perfectly floating exchange
rates are capable of isolating a given country from the interna-
tional moneycircuits. The cost of such option, however, is the
increased degree of uncertainty it represents to private agents
that enter into contracts with foreign partners, be they related to
production or to the financial circulation. The same reasonsthat
justify the existence of contracts with stably-valued
monies-of-account are valid for international transactions. Float-
ing rates force agents from different countries to accept claims
and obligations the real content of whichis basically unpredictable
in advance. It is not much different from accepting domestic
obligations the burden of whichcan only be knownafter the deal
is made. Liquidity problems are, again, verylikely to arise in these
circumstances.
Keynes had always associated himself to movements of
reformofthe international monetary systemthat intended to man-
age monetary and financial relations in such a wayas to minimize
both types of shortcomings. In particular, his bancor plan”! tried
to combine fixed exchange rates with institutions that would
manageinternational liquidity and incentives against hoarding of
Teserves on the part of nations with surpluses in their external
operations, that would have the same deflationary effect as an
increase in money retention domestically. Modern Keynesians
havestill to get hold of the subject to update the model and the
policy prescriptions.
 
24 To know Keynes's last proposal of international monetary reform,
Presented (and defeated) at the Bretton Woods conference of 1944, see
CWJMKXXV.Tofollow the negotiationsthatled to the acceptanceofthe





The dim ofthis paper was to presentthe liquidity piefer-
ence theory as a unifying principle for Keynes’s and postKeynesian macroeconomics, rather than just a theory of supply
ana demand for money.
Liquiditypreferen.22 was originally presented as a theory of
the interest +a since it was developed in The General Theoryin a iramewerk in which Gily two composite assets, money andbonds, were considered. Posterior developments, mainly due toKaldor, Robinson and Kahn showed that the scheme could becasily generalized to the determination of the structure of interestrates, by altering the degree of aggregation considered in themodel. Minsky advanced one step further by showing that thescheme could be used to explain not onlythe prices of assets butactually the balance sheet choices as a whole, including assetsand liabilities. Davidson showed that capital investment could alsobe a result of the choice of assets by private agents.
Since most of what exists as money in modern economiesis created by banks, we showedthat the behavior of the moneysupply can be approached according to the same principles thatexplainthe behaviorof the general public. In opposition to moreNaive approaches that offer extreme postulates as to theinterest-elasticity of the money supply curve, we can show thatmoney is at least partially endogenous because it is created aspart of banks’ Strategies to interact with their environment.Finally, we dealt with research subjectsthat arestill in theirfirst steps, that is how persistently high inflation changes theliquidity attributes of assets and of money in particular and howto deal with open economies. Post Keynesian theory is speciallywell-equipped to study these issues
forward contracts denominated in mo
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Important subjects still remain to be reamdee eae
economy models of liquidity preference with the same ie e
elaboration that has been dedicated to closed economy moi e s
taking into consideration the dramatic changesthat are eatate
in the international financial and monetary markets are still to be
formulated. The implications of these propositions with eee ‘0
asset pricing for theories of capital accumulation, in particularfo
the financial support of long-term accumulation are not yet clearly
formulated, especially whenone, again, remembers the ae
technical andinstitutional changes that aretaking place in pane
markets. Finally, monetary policy prescriptions have to be a
explicit from these models that obviouslyrefilse the axiom 0
moneyneutrality characteristic of neoclassical theories.
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